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Abstract— Security and Privacy concerns in Radio frequency identification (RFID) technology particularly RFID Card, is a wide 
research area which have attracted researchers for over a decade. Authenticating users at the Card end of the RFID technology 
constitutes one of the major sources of attacks on the system. In this research, we studied the various known attacks and mitigation 
available. We proposed a conceptual framework that that can be used to mitigate the unauthorized use of RFID Card. This concept will 
mitigate the single point of the RFID card failure: unauthorized use.   
 
Index Terms— Authorization, Challenges, Authentication, Vulnerability, Compromise, Enhancement, RFID Card, Privacy, 
Biometric system, fingerprint 
 
 
1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Radio frequency identifier (RFID) is one among the series of 
wireless technology gaining faster and wider adoption in our 
today society due to its portability, mobility and flexibility of 
use. These unique characteristics constitute its wide adoption in 
various application such as conveyor systems, container and 
document identification, stock inventorying, transport tracking 
system, time sensitive application, self monitoring application 
such as expiry date alerts, and anti-counterfeiting of product;  
consequently, a replacement to the traditional way of object 
identification: Bar-Code. Hence, traditional way of identification 
is fast paving way for the RFID agile mode of identification, 
which in itself has various security and privacy concerns, which 
is due to the inherent vulnerabilities in the architecture of the 
RFID system. 
 
 
 
2 RFID ARCHITECTURE 
 
The RFID system comprises the tag, reader, backend database, 
and or control unit as illustrated in Figure 1. The tag comprises a 
radio frequency chip, encoding and decoding circuitry, antenna 
unit, and or a memory unit. Depending on power capacity, a tag 
can be classified into passive, semi-active or active tag.  
 
Tags without internal power supply, are called passive tags, tags 
without internal power supply but only uses the internal supply 
for its internal memory circuitry are called semi-active, while 
tags that uses its internal power unit to power both its internal 
circuitry and the antenna unit for communication are called 
active tags. Additionally, tags can be categorized based on their 
frequency of communication. The communication frequency 
between the tag and the reader determines the energy and read 
range, and in some instance, the size of the tag. The reader 
communicates with the tag through tag interrogation,    
 
3 OPERATING FREQUENCY OF RFID SYSTEM 
 
RFID tag can be classified based on the frequency they operate. 
Generally, they are classified into three categories namely; the 
low frequency (LF), high frequency (HF), and the ultra high 
frequency (UHF).  The LF class of tags primarily operates at 
125 kHz, and within the range ≥30 kHz and ≤300 kHz.  The HF 
RFID tag (which is the commonly used tag) operates primarily 
at 13. 56 MHz, and within the range of ≤3 MHz and ≥30MHz. 
This is similar to the Federal communications commission 
(FCC) stated boundary of 13. 56 MHz +/-17 KHz Industrial 
Scientific and Medical (ISM) use [2].   
The UHF class of RFID tags range between 300MHz to 3GHz, 
albeit, the UHF tags in the Gen-2 protocols operates in ranges of 
≥866MHz and ≤960MHz but it applicability varies in different 
countries [1]. These operating frequencies determine the data rate 
and the read range of the RFID system. Based on frequency 
range, the operating read range of the passive RFID tag operates 
at ≥30cm, ≥1m, and ≥7m for LF, HF and UHF tags respectively.  
However, for an active tag, the nominal range could span 100m 
since it does not require the reader to power its internal 
circuitry[3].   
 
 
4 APPLICATION OF RFID  
 
Due to the extensive read range of the RFID tag, its application 
area has grown widely and yet RFID technology has not 
achieved its optimum application areas.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.1 Contactless Payment System 
 
This is the process of paying or transacting using a cashless 
medium. The Exxon-Mobil speed pass employs RFID to speed 
customer through fuel purchase [4]. A passive RFID tag is 
mounted on the vehicle or attached to the key chain of the 
consumers, which is activated by a reader attached to the pump 
of the fueling station. The reader handshakes with the tag and 
reads the encrypted number. This number is then sent through 
the linking cable between the reader and the pump to a satellite 
receiver of the gas station. This is then sent to a datacenter 
where the authorization, verification and accounting are done. 
The E-Z pass toll system is similar to the speed pass. When a car 
enters the toll zone, the reader antenna in the zone activates the 
car-mounted tag. An encoded number is then communicated 
back to the reader, which is further transmitted through a 
secured channel to a back end database and control system.  
 
4.2  Electronic Article Surveillance (EAS) System 
  
One problem in the retail industry is dealing with product 
leaving the store without proper payment, be it intentional or not 
[5]. The idea behind the EAS system is the AES system is to 
limit shoplifting through the adoption of RFID system. Passive 
RFID tag is integrated into items, upon purchase, the tag is 
deactivated or notification is made for verification [6]. This is 
achieved with the aid of the reader setting up an interrogation 
zone. When any item carrying a tag passes the 
door/entrance/exit, an alarm or surveillance system is activated. 
This is then deactivated upon purchase [7,8]. 
 
4.3 Container Identification and Tracking 
 
For container shipping application, a typical RFID device is 
operated in an ultrahigh frequency or microwave range (e. g. 
900MHz or 2. 45GHz in the U. S. A.  or 5. 8GHz in Europe). 
RFID recognition system in container is applied by mounting 
the tag on the container/item/pallet, through hanged read/write 
or write/read equipment installed in the forklift or handset or a 
handset read write equipment to recognize the dynamic 
information on the tag. The information read can be transmitted 
to a monitor system or control database. Every cargo unit has 
embedded RFID tag and all the information each tag is stored on 
a central control computer of the warehouse. The read/write 
equipment detects and reports information about every cargo 
and automobile working and which cargo is transported [9].  
 
4.4 E-Passport and Document Identification 
 
The data-page of machine-readable passport is embedded with 
44 characters bearing the name of the holder, country and 
passport number. The integration of RFID into machine readable 
document (MRD) therefore balances the need for electronic data 
storage with automated document control [10].  The e-passport 
contains a contactless RFID chip and an aerial embedded on one 
of its pages [11] and its cover has a built-in metallic 
shield/Faraday cage to prevent unauthorized reading of the tag 
inside the passport.  The chip contains an operating system 
(OS), application program and a set of data grouping 
conforming to the international civil aviation organization 
(ICAO) logical data structure[6]. 
 
 
4.5 Tag Implantation 
“Mu-chip” (the smallest passive transponder about 0. 4mm) can 
be  embedded into a paper sheets to track document which can 
only be read at a range of a few centimeters due to the size of 
the antenna.  Another smaller size of RFID tag is the Veri-chip.  
It is about the size of a grain of rice and it is often implanted into 
human being, pets, as well as live stocks [12]Implantation chips 
can also work in identifying wandering Alzheimer’s patients 
who got out without identity or cognizance of their location and 
destination.  On October 14, 2004 [13], an article titled “identity 
chip planted under skin approved for use in health care” was on 
the New York Times and much other publication. Veri-chip was 
cloned in less than ten minutes by a Canadian hardware 
developer for the purpose of an article in Wired magazine [14].  
According to [15], 900 hospitals have agreed to participate in 
the Veri-Med system, and about 600 people have received 
implant while the company has begun direct-to-customer 
campaign in targeted market such as South Florida[16].   
 
4.6 Contactless Smart Card 
 
This area of RFID application has gained wider adoption in 
physical access control system, and cashless payment processes.  
Example of such includes toll payment, e-passport, building 
access control, and so on.  In 1994 and 1995, around 1million of 
contactless smart Cards were produced per year for public 
transport application, the volume rose to 4million per year in 
1996 and 1997 [17].  In building access control, RFID tag can 
simply be called a key for access [3].  This can be seen in 
proximity and vicinity Cards 
 
5. SECURITY AND PRIVACY CHALLENGES IN RFID 
SYSTEM 
 
This section presents the various challenges associated with the 
RFID system with respect to the physical layer. 
 
 
5.1 RFID Tag Cloning Attack 
 
Cloning or counterfeiting of tag is simply forging the data 
illicitly gathered from an authentic tag into another tag usually a 
blank tag. Cloning of tag is one of the possible end products of 
skimming attack [7],[18] ; an attack which harnesses the 
vulnerability of cheaper cost of production of tag[19].  
 
5.2 Physical Attack 
 
A close look at the architecture from the attacker perspective 
will reveal the delicate location of the antenna and even the 
RFID tag itself [6]. Depending on the intention of the attacker, 
physical attack could range from trying to explore manufacturer 
product, to complete destruction of tag. For instance, placing a 
tag inside in microwave oven is a direct way of frying a tag [7] 
while a simple EMP practice could damage the internal circuitry 
and even the tag as well. 
 
5.3 Skimming Attack 
 
Skimming attack is done by surreptitiously reading [6] the data of 
the tag without the authorization of the tag holder. This attack 
exploits the promiscuity of an RFID tag. An RFID tag does not 
have the intelligence to decide when to function or not, and so, it 
continually transmit beacons to any reader available to it. 
Additionally, it is a major tool in exploiting the vulnerabilities in 
RFID technology [11]. 
 
5.4 Spoofing Attack 
Spoofing attack is an impersonation attack in which an attacker 
masquerades as a reader in order to interrogate tags [6]. The 
obtained response is then used as a means for later 
communication. When the legitimate reader queries the tag, the 
attacker will send the obtained response to the reader [18],[20]. 
 
5.5 Relay Attack 
 
This attack can also be referred to as a Man-in-the-middle 
(MITM) attack.  It is a technical way of fooling RFID tag and 
reader, as though they are communicating with each other.  The 
attacker devices two units; a malicious reader which is called a 
Mole and a malicious tag called Proxy and both are connected 
via a communication link.  The mole is set to interface with the 
authentic tag while the proxy interfaces with the reader.   The 
Mole initiates communication with the tag, and then sends the 
response to the proxy.  The proxy then forwards the response to 
the authentic reader.  The fooled authentic reader sends back its 
response to proxy, which forwards it to the authentic tag through 
the Mole[21],[22]. [23] demonstrated a practical relay attack on e-
voting system. similarly, [19] performed a practical relay attack 
on the communication process between a tag and a reader. 
 
5.6 Denial of Service (DOS) Attack 
 
His attack involves jamming the operating frequency of the 
communication channel of the RFID system: compromising the 
availability of resources.  It could be denial of reading or denial 
of authentication [24], tag destruction [6]. This type of attack is 
aimed at preventing communication between the tag and the 
reader. 
 
5.7 Clandestine Tracking 
This is an illicit acquisition of information usually for the 
purpose of subversion or deception. This is major privacy 
concern [25]. Clandestine tracking exploits the ubiquitous nature 
of the RFID tag, thus making it a very common and easy-to-
achieve attack. Additionally, the EPC network does not provide 
explicit protection against clandestine tracking [26]. 
Various researchers have studied these vulnerabilities, and 
proposed numerous protocols, methods, technique as well as 
standards against these attacks. 
 
 
6. RELATED RESEARCH 
 
The adoption of RFID technology into areas like physical access 
control have generated questions such as; ‘how can I know when 
my Card is being read’, how can the Card detect the authentic 
owner of the Card.  Series of such question have trailed the stage 
of RFID technology 
 
 
 
 
 
6.1 RFID Guardian 
 
RFID guardian addressed issues such as denial of service, and 
privacy concerns while still enhancing the prevention of RFID 
ubiquity vulnerability exploitation through the integration of 
query audit, key management, access control and authentication 
[5]. It is a portable battery powered device that mediates 
interaction through selective frequency jamming and spoofing 
between RFID reader and a transponder [20] capable of two-way 
communication [5]. RFID Guardian establishes a privacy zone 
around the user in which only authenticated readers are allowed 
access, by acting like a reader, querying tag and decoding tag 
response [6].   
However, one main disadvantage accrued to RFID guardian is 
range. Since it is expected to guard all tag in the user vicinity, its 
range should be between 1-2m [6]. This is a violation of ISO 
14443-reader range specification of 10cm. In addition, the 
guardian itself represents a single point of failure; if the guardian 
fails or compromises, the user is unprotected and it can be easily 
lost or even forgotten [6]. Integrating RFID guardian into a PDA 
(for instance) could reduce this weakness but not prevent it. 
Being a battery powered device, an attack could target draining 
of its power by flooding the communication zone with series of 
irrelevant communications.  Furthermore, it does not guarantee 
an unauthorized reader from knowing the existence of the tag.  
 
6.2 RFID Blocker Tag 
 
Blocker tag [27] simulates the full sets of 2k possible RFID-tag 
serial number.  It has the ability to block the RFID tree-walking 
singulation algorithm [7],[28] protocol used by the reader to select 
a particular tag. The blocker tag simulates the full spectrum of 
the possible serial number of the tag thereby obscuring the serial 
number of other tags. Blocker tag may be used to establish a 
save zone around a tag [6], preventing tag from being read. In 
order to make blocker tag more flexible, it is possible to 
implement a form of selective blocking [6]. Hence, a blocker tag 
helps to protect the privacy of the user from a malicious hidden 
reader.  
The principal point of weakness of the blocker tag is the lack of 
flexibility [6]. Reliance on a blocker tag in a sparsely populated 
tag and reader environment does not prevent tracking of the tag 
and even active jamming. Blocker tag therefore provides 
temporary solution to privacy concerns and lesser or no security 
solution to RFID tag in the RFID system.  
 
6.3 Labeling 
Labeling a tag or content containing RFID tag is one way of 
informing a user of the presence of the RFID tag [18]. It is a 
major awareness ground upon which privacy of RFID system is 
elucidated, and accepted as part of the Bill-of-Right [6]. 
However, it also announces itself to malicious user. Hence, it 
complicates issues for security unravelment. Although, it works 
for privacy concerns but aids the exploitation of the 
vulnerability of the system by an attacker. 
 
6.4 Kill Command 
 
Some RFID tag has built-in kill command [6]. Auto-ID center 
and EPC global created a kill-command specification for 
permanent tag inoperability [29] some of which requires 32-bit 
password; a Class-1Gen-2 EPC standard tag. Thus, a tag can be 
destroyed or killed by sending a special kill-command and 
including the right coded password. The inclusion of the 
password is to prevent unauthorized killing [6] as well as 
enforcing user confidentiality [30]. However, it also exposes the 
tag to unauthorized killing by a malicious adversary; hence, a 
built-in kill command can be used by a malicious to cause a 
denial of service of attack by inputting the correct kill-
command, at an inappropriate time. Similarly, an authentic user 
can mistakenly input the correct built-in kill command at a 
wrong timing.   
 
6.5 RFID Zapper  
 
This is another method of enhancing the privacy in RFID 
technology. An RFID zapper practically creates an 
electromagnetic impulse (EMP) within the boundary of its 
influence [31],[18]. [31] demonstrated a practical Zapper with a 
set-up EMP from a low cost disposable camera. Zapper can 
destroy the tag without necessarily altering the product carrying 
the tag [6] as against a microwave oven. Additionally, zapper is 
portable, hence can enable destruction of tag at the point of 
purchase of goods.   
 
6.6 Authentication Protocols 
 
[32] proposed an authentication protocol on new HMAC-based 
protocol as advancement on the ones proposed by [33], [34] and 
[35]. The new Hash-based Message Authentication Code 
(HMAC-BASED) protocol in which H was assumed to be a 
one-way hash function [32] could also be used to prevent 
skimming attack. BurrowAbadiNeedham89 (BAN) logic [36] was 
adopted for this new HMAC-based protocol. RFID distance 
bounding protocol proposed by [21] can be effective in the 
defense against relay attack. According [21], relay attack 
introduces some delay in the transmission which conventional 
cryptographic measure employed in RFID system at the 
application layer due to much synchronization, and other 
mechanism for error-handling, anti-collision, e. t. c. cannot 
detect. [37] proposed a distance-bounding or secure-position 
protocol integrated into the physical layer of the communication 
protocol which can detect relay attack through high resolution 
timing information on bit arrival. Researches available in 
authentication of RFID systems are targeted at the logical 
mitigation leaving the physical authentication vulnerable to 
attacks.  
 
6.7 Physical-Layer Identification Technique 
 
The physical layer communication of the RFID system is the 
first layer of communication of the RFID system. It is also the 
gateway for RFID technology as well as the first point of call for 
security defenses and privacy regulation. [42] designed, 
implemented, and evaluated a technique called PARADIS: to 
identify the source network interface Card of an 802. 11 frame 
by analyzing the physical layer of the passive radio-frequency 
analysis. Radiometric identification (radio frequency 
fingerprinting) was the technique adopted by them for wireless 
device identification. Experimental result for physical 
identification by PARADIS yielded 99% accuracy [42]. [43] 
adopted same principle in their experiment on RFID passive 
UHF tag identification but utilizes time domain features and 
spectral principal component analysis (PCA) for extraction and 
matching of the fingerprinting respectively. Using similar 
principle, [44] experimented on physical-layer identification of 
RFID passive tags but on HF tags. Results from their 
experiments showed that RFID cloning challenge can be solved. 
 
 
6.8 Anti-Counterfeiting Technology 
 
The unique identifier of RFID systems is susceptible to 
forgery/cloning attack. This attack can be mitigated via challenge 
response authentication protocol [29]. Engineering Researchers at 
the University of Arkansas developed an anti-counterfeiting 
method against RFID tag [39]. In their research, they discovered 
that each tag has a minimum power response at multiple 
frequencies, constituting its unique physical characteristics. [41] 
proposed a chaos theory for detecting cloned tag. [40] 
demonstrated a resistive technique against cloning of RFID tags 
through challenge response authentication.  
 
6.9 Fingerprint Biometric Authentication on Smart Card 
 
[45] modeled a framework for such an authentication procedure, 
on a smart Card. In their framework, a fingerprint sensor was 
used in capturing the fingerprint. They reduced the captured 
image into minutiae points, and was stored as a template in the 
Card through a Card Reader. The authenticating process 
involved a match-on-Card (MOC), through a system-on-Card 
(SOC).  Similarly, [46] proposed a two-factor authentication 
system based on combined fingerprint recognition and smart RF 
Card verification. From their experiment, they concluded that 
the optimization does not reduce the data precision, and that 
fingerprint recognition algorithm has good performance on 
hardware system.   
 
6.10 Controllable Tag 
 
[47] proposed a tag, which can be controlled by the user, 
sampling various experimental designs. In one sample, the tag 
was equipped with indicator (both acoustic and visual effect) to 
indicate tag in-use or otherwise. In order to control the activity 
of the tag, they integrated a switch system, which can be 
manually activated. Additionally, they designed tag that operates 
based on orientation, daylight and darkness, and proximity 
dependant. Similarly, [48] investigated the integration of a smart 
Card, and electrical switch to enhance high level of security and 
privacy protection measure. In their design, parallel plate 
conductors was used to decide the state of the switch, controlled 
with human finger. Clip tag [49] protects against privacy concerns 
in addition to post point of sale negotiation [6]. It does not 
provide any security guide or measure. Faraday cage/shield [50] 
can prevent tags from being read [6].  
In view of the above, various proposed mitigation measure have 
not taken into consideration the vulnerabilities posed by user-
end authentication at the physical-layer of the RFID technology.  
Consequentially, unauthorized use of tag has led to practical 
security and privacy breach in the  
RFID system.  
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Tag  
ö ö ö × ö × √ ö √ 
Faraday 
Cage  
√ √ × × √ × √ ö ö 
Controllabl
e Tag 
√ √ ö × √ × √ ö √ 
Biometric 
authenticat
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ö ö √ ö ö ö ö ö ö 
Anti-
counterfeit
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× × × √ × √ × √ × 
Physical-
layer 
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on 
technique  
× × × √ × √ × √ × 
Authentica
tion 
protocol 
ö ö × ö √ ö ö ö ö 
Labeling Creates user awareness 
RFID 
Guardian 
ö √ × × √ × √ ö ö 
RFID 
Blocker 
Tag  
√ √ × × √ × ö ö √ 
 
 
 
 
Unauthorized tag use/read particularly at the tag end can be 
mitigated through the integration of methods such as clip tag, 
biometric authentication protocol, and Faraday shield as 
indicated in Table 1. 
 
 
 
7. PROPOSED FRAMEWORK 
 
From the analysis of Table 1, we proposed a conceptual 
framework which can be integrated into the RFID Card to 
mitigate the unauthorized use of Card.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Our research aim to integrate biometric authentication process 
and a Faraday shield into a clippable RFID Card.  The processes 
are divided into three stages as shown in figure 2.  
 
Stage 1: Design and fabrication of tag 
This stage comprises the design, calibration, simulation and 
fabrication of the tag antenna, and a controllable joint connected 
to a controller. 
 
Stage2: Fingerprint Matching and storage 
This stage involves the process of acquiring, authenticating, 
securing and storage of the biometric authentication process, 
fingerprint in this case. 
 
Stage3: System building and testing 
This stage entails the integration of the various phases in a 
secured control unit and testing of the prototype.  
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
In this research, we identified the various challenges facing 
RFID Card, with careful reference to the physical layer. We also 
highlighted the diverse application areas of the RFID technology 
TABLE 1 
RFID PHYSICAL-LAYER ATTACK-MITIGATION ANALYSIS 
Mitigation 
Attacks 
√ indicated that the mitigation measure is applied to such threat 
× indicates that the measure does not apply to that threat  
ö indicates the measure can be combined with other measures 
 
Fingerprint 
matching 
process 
Acquiring 
Fingerprin
t and 
process 
image 
Features 
extraction 
processin
g and 
template 
formation 
Stage 3: System building &Testing 
Stage 2: Fingerprint acquisition and 
matching 
Stage 1: Design and Fabrication of antenna Tag 
System integration 
and control  
Validate 
Fingerprint Module 
Identification 
and 
fabrication of 
clippable tag 
Design of a 
controllable 
Faraday 
shield 
Fig 2: Concept framework of our proposed framework 
as well as some possible area of application. Furthermore, we 
proposed a conceptual framework to mitigate the challenges 
facing RFID card; unauthorized use of Card in particular.  
This concept will be fully implemented in our future work, and 
will be evaluated in line with the various known attacks and 
strategies. 
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